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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS DILLON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020595-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain Dillon's conviction of burglary 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-202. This Court "will conclude that the 
evidence was insufficient when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence 'is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was 
convicted.'" State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 18, 10 P.3d 346, 352 (quoting State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). Because this issue was not preserved below, it is 
reviewed for plain error. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at f 11. Alternatively, this issue should be 
reviewed to determine whether defense counsel's failure to move for a directed verdict 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel? Where the claim of ineffective assistance of 
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counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the issue is resolved as a matter of 
law. State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah App.), cert denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (1994). 
2. Whether the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during cross-examination 
of Dillon? "This [C]ourt will reverse on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct only if 
defendant has shown that 'the actions or remarks of [prosecuting] counsel call to the 
attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its 
verdict and, if so, under the circumstances of the particular case, whether the error is 
substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in the absence, 
there would have been a more favorable result."' State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 
(Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted). This issue 
was partially preserved through an oral objection made at trial (R. 252). This Court 
should review the unpreserved part of this issue for plain error. See State v. Saunders, 
1999 UT 59, ^ 30, 992 P.2d 951 (Plain error analysis applied to claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct not raised at trial). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All controlling statutory or constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Douglas D. Dillon appeals from the judgment, sentence, and commitment of the 
Fifth District Court after he was convicted by a jury of failure to respond to officer's 
signal to stop, a third degree felony; theft, a third degree felony; burglary, a third degree 
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felony; driving while suspended, disqualified, or revoked, a class B misdemeanor; 
improper passing, a class C misdemeanor; and speeding, a class C misdemeanor. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Douglas D. Dillon was charged by Information filed in Fifth District Court on May 
19, 2000, with the following criminal violations: Count I - failure to respond to officer's 
signal to stop, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-13.5; 
Count II - theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-404; 
Count III - burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-
202; Count IV - driving while suspended, disqualified, or revoked, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 53-3-227; Count V - improper 
passing, a class C misdemeanor; and Count VI - speeding, a class C misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-46 (R. 5-6). 
On May 19, 2000, during his initial appearance, Dillon was found indigent and 
appointed defense counsel, Odean Bowler. (R. 4). On August 15, 2000, Odean Bowler 
withdrew as counsel and a Substitution of Counsel was allowed. Keith Barnes was 
appointed as substitute defense counsel (R. 30). 
On October 10, 2000, Dillon was not present during a Resolution Hearing. The 
State requested issuance of a warrant. The Court ordered a warrant issued with bail set at 
$30,000 cash or bond. Barnes was allowed to withdraw as defense counsel (R. 37). 
On May 24, 2001, Brian Harris was appointed as defense counsel during a Review 
Hearing (R. 58). 
On June 11, 2001, Dillon waived his right to a preliminary hearing (R. 68). 
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On June 14, 2001, Dillon was arraigned and not guilty pleas were entered. In 
addition, Dillon again waived his right to a preliminary hearing (R. 70). 
On September 5, 2001, during a pretrial conference, the court granted a request by 
Harris to withdraw as counsel for Dillon. The court appointed Kenneth L. Combs as 
defense counsel. The case was stricken from the trial calendar and reset for a one (1) day 
jury trail (R. 81). 
On December 11, 2001, the State issued an Amended Information, alleging that 
Dillon had been convicted twice before of theft, robbery, or any burglary (R. 104). 
On April 1, 2002, the jury trial was continued because Dillon did not have 
appropriate clothing. The Court took evidence of prior convictions under review. A 
Pretrial Conference was set for April 24, 2002 and Trial was set for April 29, 2002 (R. 
130). 
On April 24, 2002, before the Honorable James L. Shumate, it was decided that the 
matter would proceed to trial as scheduled and be given number one priority status. The 
Court ordered defense counsel to provide Dillon with clothes prior to trial (R. 145). 
On April 29, 2002, a jury trial was held under the direction of the Honorable James 
L. Shumate. (R.154). Dillon was found guilty of all six counts by the jury trial after a two-
hour deliberation. The jury was polled and all jurors agreed as to the convictions. The 
Court ordered a pre-sentence investigation (R. 154). 
On June 5, 2002, Dillon was sentenced to 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison on 
Counts I-III, six months in the Washington Jail on Count IV, and 90 days in jail for 
Counts V and VI. Counts II and II were ordered to be served concurrently and count I 
was ordered consecutive to counts II and III. In addition, the trial court strongly 
recommended that Dillon serve the full prison and jail sentences imposed (R. 161-163). 
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The trial court also ordered Dillon to pay a fine in the amount of $9,250 for counts I-III, a 
fine of $1,850 for count IV, and a fine of $1,387 for counts V and VI (Id.). 
On July 15, 2002, during a clarification hearing, the Court ordered Combs to 
submit a formal Notice of Appeal with five (5) days. The Court also ordered that the 
appeal time period be stayed from June 21, 2002 through July 15, 20002 to allow for 
timely filing (R. 174). 
On July 16, 2002, Combs filed a Notice of Appeal on behalf of Dillon in Fifth 
District Court (R. 175). 
On April 3, 2003, Margaret Lindsay filed a motion to withdraw as counsel based 
on Dillon demanding she withdraw (R. 198). On April 15, 2003, the State opposed the 
motion to withdraw because it did not allege sufficient good cause (R. 193-196). On June 
4, 2002, during a remand hearing regarding the motion to withdraw as counsel, the trial 
court denied the motion to withdraw (R. 214). 
On January 20, 2004, this Court remanded this case to the Fifth District Court to 
reconstruct missing portions of the transcripts (R. 219-220). 
On January 20, 2004, Dillon filed a Pro Se Motion for Dismissal (R. 227-231). On 
February 11, 2004, during a review hearing for the Motion of Dismissal, the State 
objected to the motion because 1) the Defendant has already been convicted at trial; 2) the 
motion was not timely; 3) the defendant is represented by counsel and cannot file a pro se 
motion; and 4) material issues of fact prevent dismissal (R. 234-235). On July 24, 2004, 
during a review hearing, the Court denied Dillon's motion for dismissal (R. 268). 
On August 4, 2004, during a review hearing, the trial court directed the State to 
prepare an Order, ordering that Dillon be given access to the video tapes of the trial, two 
days in a row to allow for review of the tapes (R 271). An evidentiary hearing to 
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reconstruct the records was held on September 14, 2004 (R. 279-80). During the hearing 
the trial court noted that the defense objected to jury instruction #14-G at trial (R. 495: 
20). On September 30, 2004, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law 
in regards to this Court's order of remand (R. 282-286). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Testimony of Detective Shane Copeland 
On the evening of May 18, 2000, while patrolling in the Sky Mountain area, at 
approximately 10:30 p.m., Detective Shane Copeland of the Hurricane City Police 
Department, encountered the defendant, Douglas Dillon (R. 190:71). Copeland pulled 
behind Dillon and saw the truck Dillon was driving had Arizona plates (R. 190:71). The 
time of night and the area led Copeland to run the plates (R. 190:71). 
As soon as Copeland pulled behind him, Dillon instantly made a u-turn (R. 
190:71). Copeland also made a u-turn and followed Dillon for a couple blocks (R. 
190:72). Dillon then made a right-hand turn heading back towards Hurricane, then 
another right-hand turn heading back to where he was going before he made the u-turn. 
These moves led Copeland to believe that he had enough reasonable suspicion to pull 
Dillon over and find out what was going on (R. 190:72). When Copeland activated his 
lights, which are located in his windshield (R. 190:114), Dillon pulled over immediately. 
Copeland got out of his blue Ford Taurus unmarked police car (R. 190:110) and began to 
approach Dillon's vehicle, at which point Dillon took off down the road. (R. 190:72). 
Copeland was not in uniform, but could not remember what he was wearing (R. 190:112). 
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Copeland returned to his car and began following Dillon (R. 190:72). Copeland 
pursued Dillon onto westbound SR-9, about mile marker six and a half, heading toward 
the freeway (R. 190:72). At this time, Copeland had his lights on and he then turned on 
his siren (R. 190:73). Dillon was traveling westbound in the fast lane (R. 190:73). Dillon 
used the left-turn lane, or the median lane, to pass the two cars traveling in the fast land 
ahead of him (R. 190:73). Copeland was going 95 mph to catch up with Dillon, and 
estimated Dillon's speed at 85 to 90 mph (R. 190:74). Copeland was driving his 
unmarked police car and it has a calibrated speedometer (R. 190:73). Copeland observed 
that Dillon was speeding and passing improperly and in his opinion endangered others on 
State Road 9 (R. 190:81) 
When Copeland was close enough to read Dillon's license plate he ran the plate to 
see if the vehicle was stolen (R. 190:73). After a three to three and a half mile pursuit, at 
approximately mile marker three, Dillon pulled over (R. 190:74, 75). As soon as Dillon 
crossed the bridge, he pulled over (R. 190:76). Officer Gubler was coming across the 
bridge with his lights on preparing to make a u-turn to pull behind Copeland (R. 190:76). 
During the stop, Dillon's first comments were that the reason he did not stop was 
that he was driving on a suspended driver's license and he did not want to get caught (R. 
190:77). When Copeland asked for Dillon's identification, Dillon informed him that his 
wallet was in the console of his truck. After Dillon was secured, Copeland went to the 
truck, opened the door, and looked through the console. The truck was a king cab and 
Copeland could see several tools on the back seat (R. 190:77). 
Upon returning to Dillon, Copeland asked him who the tools belonged to because 
he could see the name Zitting Construction or Zitting Brothers written with some type of 
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permanent marker on the tools (R. 190:81). Dillon said they were his tools (R. 190:77, 
78). Dillon said he had owned the tools for a couple of weeks (R. 190:78). 
Further investigation with Officer Gubler, led Copeland back to the Sky Mountain 
area where he found a construction trailer with the doors open that appeared to have been 
broken into (R. 190:82). The trailer was approximately four or five blocks from where 
Copeland initially encountered Dillon (R. 190:82). The trailer was labeled with the words 
"Zitting Construction" or "Zitting Brothers" (R. 190:83). Copeland and Gubler made 
contact with Bill Zitting, one of the owners of the trailers (R. 190:83). At approximately 
1:00 in the morning, Copeland was able to contact Bill Zitting and Copeland had him 
come to the scene of the alleged theft and identify if there was anything missing out of the 
trailer (R. 190:83). 
After finding out that Zitting did have some tools stolen out of his trailer, they took 
him to the police department and had him identify markings on the tools confiscated from 
Dillon (R. 190:86). Copeland took pictures of the items in Dillon's vehicle, which 
included a toolbelt, a Hitachi router, a Dewalt router, a couple of Skilsaws, a chainsaw, a 
Dewalt sander, a three-foot level, a nailgun, a staplegun, and bolt cutters (R. 190:86-89). 
Copeland was not the main investigator into how the trailer was broken into, that 
was handled by Officer Gubler. (R. 190:84). The lock for the trailer had been thrown to 
the side of the trailer (R. 190:91). The officers observed that the hasps on the trailer had 
been cut, not the lock itself (R. 190:92). Based on Copeland's experience, he believed 
that the mechanism to the trailer was cut with bolt cutters (R. 190:93). No picture was 
taken of the cut hasp, (R. 190:104); nor was the hasp mechanism that was cut retained for 
evidence (R. 191:106). No fingerprints were taken from the lock, the hasps, or anything 
on the door (R. 190:132). 
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After reading Dillon his Miranda rights, Copeland asked him if he wanted to talk 
and at that time Dillon told Copeland he would talk to him if he would shut off the tape 
recorder Copeland had turned on for the interview (R. 190:94). Copeland asked Dillon 
where he got the tools and how long he had them. Dillon said that he had paid $300 from 
some man. Dillon did not give a description of the man (R. 190:95). When asked what 
the man looked like, what the man was driving, and where the man could be found, 
Dillon was could not give Copeland any answers (R. 190:96). Because Dillon could not 
give Copeland any further information, the interview was ended. (R. 190:96). 
B. Testimony of Officer Stacy Gubler 
Officer Stacy Gubler of the Hurricane City Police Department, was patrolling out 
west on State Route 9 on the night of May 18, 2000. After hearing Copeland radio that he 
was involved in a car chase and was headed his way, Gubler coordinated with Copeland, 
and let him know he was headed in his direction. (R. 190:154). Gubler could see 
Copeland's lights as he came across the bridge, but could not hear his siren because his 
window was up. (R. 190:153). 
Gubler was heading east and when Copeland and Dillon started to pull over, 
Gubler "flipped around and came into the side of the, Mr. Dillon's, vehicle." (R. 
190:154). Gubler participated in the felony stop. (R. 190:154). Gubler observed tools in 
the back seat of Dillon's truck that were marked with Zitting Brothers or Zitting 
Construction on them. (R. 190:155). 
Gubler was the duty car out patrolling, so he went back to the area where the chase 
originated to see if he could locate where the tools might have come from. (R. 190:156). 
Gubler found a cargo type trailer parked on the side of the street with the rear doors open. 
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(R. 190:156). Gubler contacted Copeland and told him that he believed he found where 
the tools had come from. (R. 190:156). Gubler used dispatch to assist him in locating the 
phone number of the construction company identified on the trailer and he started making 
phone calls to see if they could locate the owners. (R. 190:156). 
Gubler was able to reach Bill Zitting, the owner of the trailer, and had him come 
out to the construction site. (R. 190:157). Zitting looked in the trailer and said that he was 
missing numerous tools and the description he gave of the tools matched the tools that 
had been recovered from Dillon's vehicle. (R. 190:157). Zitting then went to the police 
department and made a positive identification of the tools. (R. 190:157). Gubler 
remembered Dillon making the comment that he'd had the tools for a while. (R. 190:157). 
Zitting told Gubler that he had used the tools earlier in the day and that they had been put 
in the trailer and closed up at about 5:00 p.m. that same day. (R. 190:159). 
C. Testimony of William Zitting 
William Zitting is a resident of Hurricane and owns Zitting Brothers Construction 
with his brothers. (R. 190:170). Zitting was called around 1:00 a.m. on May 19, 2000, by 
the Hurricane Police Department to identify a trailer that had been broken into. (R. 
190:170). Zitting met the police at the construction trailer that was located at Sky 
Mountain Estates. (R. 190:171). Zitting Brothers Construction was building several 
houses in that subdivision and it was their practice to leave the construction trailer on-site 
for the night. (R. 190:171). 
The police were already at the scene when Zitting arrived. The police asked him 
to identify or tell them what tools were missing. (R. 190:171). The trailer is seven feet 
wide and twelve feet long and is used to haul jobs around from job to job. (R. 190:172). 
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Zitting was supervising that particular job site on May 18, 2000 and left at 5:00 p.m. (R. 
190: 173). Zitting did not remember if he locked up the trailer or if someone else had that 
evening. (R. 190:173). Zitting saw that the latch was cut on the back of the trailer. (R. 
190:173). Zitting believed that the latch was cut by bolt cutters instead of a saw. (R. 
190:174). Zitting went to the police station and identified the tools that were taken from 
Dillon's vehicle. (R. 190:177). Zitting testified that there were some tools left in the 
trailer, such as ladders and wheelbarrows, boxes of nails. (R. 190:203). Zitting priced the 
total tools that were stolen at $1,340 (R. 190:). 
D. Testimony of Douglas Dillon 
On the evening of May 18, 2000, Dillon was in Hurricane looking for a Western 
Union at around 6:00 p.m. Dillon found a Western Union at a store down the street from 
the Day's Inn. (R. 190:229). Dillon is not from the Hurricane area and does not know the 
area very well. (R. 190:229). While at the store waiting for his wire, Dillon made a call to 
Al Flori. (R. 190:230). Dillon had known Flori for three or four years and had bought 
used tools from him quite a few times in the past. (R. 190:230). Dillon bought the tools 
in question from Flori that evening at around 9:00 p.m. (R. 190:235). Dillon has been 
selling tools for about eight years in Las Vegas and usually stays in Cedar City. (R. 
190:231). Flori had been gambling and needed money, so he met Dillon at the Days Inn 
to sell him tools. (R. 190:233). Dillon paid $300 for the tools. (R. 190:262). Dillon 
testified that he did not steal the tools that were in his truck and he did not know that the 
tools were stolen. Dillon had been buying tools from Flori for years and had never had 
any trouble. (R. 190:241). Dillon estimated the total value of the tools at $600. (R. 
190:262). After leaving the Days Inn, Dillon made a left-hand turn and noticed he was 
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going the wrong way, so he made a u-turn. He noticed a car make a u-turn and follow 
him. (R. 190:234). The car followed him for a "long ways," and because it did not pull 
him over Dillon was not sure if it was a cop and he became suspicious. (R. 190:235-236). 
Dillon pulled over when Copeland turned on his lights; however, Dillon testified that he 
took off, because the person did not appear to be a cop. He wasn't in uniform and he 
wasn't in a cop car, (R. 190:236), and the area where he was pulled over was remote. (R. 
190:237). Dillon testified that the fastest he was going was 75 mph. (R. 190:237). Dillon 
remembers passing two vehicles that were on the shoulder of the road and just went 
around them and kept driving. (R. 190:238). Dillon's windows were up and he did not 
hear the sirens. (R. 190:239). Dillon pulled over the second time because he saw the 
other two cops. (R. 190:240). Dillon told the officers that he did not have a driver's 
license. (R. 190: 240). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
One, Dillon asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he 
committed the crime of burglary in that the evidence failed to establish that he entered or 
remained unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with the intent to commit a 
felony or theft as required by Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-202. Dillon further argues 
that it was plain error for the trial court to submit the burglary charge to the jury. 
Alternatively, Dillon asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a 
directed verdict or an arrest of judgment due to the insufficient evidence presented by the 
State. 
Two, Dillon asserts that the prosecuting attorney committed prosecutorial 
misconduct in his questioning during cross-examination. Dillon asserts that this 
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questioning was obviously improper under Utah law and that he was prejudiced and 
denied a fair trial because of this improper conduct by the prosecutor. Accordingly, 
Dillon asserts that this Court must reverse his convictions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT 
DILLON COMMITTED THE CRIME OF BURGLARY 
Dillon asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he committed the 
crime of burglary and that it was plain error for the trial court to submit this charge to the 
jury. An unpreserved claim can be addressed on appeal if the "defendant can demonstrate 
that. . . 'plain error' occurred." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, Tfl 1; 10 P.3d 346 (quoting 
Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996); State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 
(Utah 1994)). 
A. The Trial Court Committed Plain Error by Submitting the Case to the Jury 
Dillon asserts that the evidence in this charge is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt 
that he committed the crime of burglary. Although this issue was not preserved below, 
Dillon asserts that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court 
committed plain error in submitting the case to the jury. 
To establish plain error in the context of an insufficiency claim, "a defendant must 
demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime 
charged " Holgate, 2000 UT 71 at f 17. "To demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient to support a jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict must marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
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when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 
1(14, 989 P.2d 1065 (quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 
1991)). "[W]e will conclude that the evidence was insufficient when, after viewing the 
evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that 
reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime for which he or she was convicted.'" Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at \ 18 (quoting 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). Then the defendant must show "that 
the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting 
the case to the jury." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at |17. 
The purpose of review under a plain error standard is to "avoid injustice." 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at 1)13 (quoting State v. Eldridge, 173 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah App. 
1989). The plain error standard also "enables the appellate court to 'balance the need for 
procedural regularity with the demands of fairness.'" Id. (quoting State v. Verde, 710 P.2d 
116, 122 n.12 (Utah 1989)). Fundamental fairness is "the touchstone of due process." 
State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87,1J15, 34 P.3d 767. 
The State is required to present evidence to support all the essential elements of the 
criminal charge. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at [^17 In order to submit a question to the jury, it 
is necessary that the prosecution present some evidence of every element needed to make 
out a cause of action. State v. Spainhower, 1999 UT App 280, \5, 988 P.2d (Utah 1999). 
To convict Dillon of burglary, the jury had to find-beyond a reasonable doubt-the 
following statutory elements: 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or 
any portion of a building with intent to commit: 
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(a) a felony; 
(b) theft;.... 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-202. 
In State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court addressed the 
issue of insufficient evidence on a burglary charge. Although no direct evidence was 
presented placing Pitts in the office, evidence was presented that the convenience store's 
business records are kept in an office in the rear of the store and that signs posted outside 
the door to the office indicate to the public that the office area is for employees only and 
others will be prosecuted. Further evidence showed that on the morning of the burglary, 
the store had received in the mail a bank envelope containing its bank statement and 
cancelled checks. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113, 114. Further testimony showed that Pitts entered 
the convenience store and left shortly thereafter with a yellow envelope similar in 
appearance to the store's bank envelope that had been delivered that morning. One 
witness testified that she asked Pitts about the envelope and he told her that the envelope 
contained checks. Another witness testified to seeing Pitts with the envelope in her home 
and that he kept it in front of him while watching television on the sofa. The witness 
testified that Pitts left the house the next morning with the bank envelope. Pitts, 728 P.2d 
113, 115. The Court held that "although the evidence as to defendant's unlawful entry 
and intent was circumstantial, it was not so ambiguous as to be susceptible to the 
interpretation that defendant was not guilty of burglary." Pitts, 728 P.2d 113, 116. 
Dillon has marshaled the evidence in his statement of the facts. However, Dillon 
will also marshal the evidence here as necessary to the argument. As in Pitts, the State 
did not present any direct evidence that Dillon committed the act. The only evidence 
presented was that Dillon was in the general area of the trailer on the evening of May 18, 
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2000. (R. 190:71), that he was in possession of the stolen tools, (R. 190:86-89), that he 
was in possession of bolt cutters that could have been used to cut the hasp on the trailer; 
and that Officer Gubler testified that the owner of the tools informed him that he had used 
the tools that day and had placed them in the trailer at approximately 5 p.m.. (R. 190:174). 
There was no evidence presented that matched the instrument used to cut the hasp to the 
bolt cutters found in Dillon's vehicle. No pictures or physical evidence were presented to 
show the damage to the hasp or how it was cut, (R. 190:104); nor was the hasp 
mechanism that was cut retained for evidence. (R. 191:106). During cross-examination, 
both Copeland and Gubler testified that they did not take fingerprints at the scene of the 
theft. 
Q. I'm assuming you took fingerprints. 
A. We didn't. 
Q. Oh. So when you got up there you didn't take any fingerprints of the 
padlock, of any of the clasps or anything on the door, a, the door itself. Or 
the tools, I'll bet, you didn't take any fingerprints of the tools either, did 
you? 
A. We didn't. 
(R. 190:132). 
Q. You've heard some testimony given by Officer Copeland today, of course, 
about the trailer and the condition it was found in. 
Did you take any photographs of the, the items that were cut, the 
mechanism that appeared to be cut? 
A. No. 
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Q. You don't have any of those today to show the jury of the areas that were 
cut or anything like that. Is that right? 
A. No. 
Q. You didn't take any fingerprints either, did you? 
A. Excuse me? 
Q. You didn't take any fingerprints either did you at that scene? 
A. We took photographs of the trailer and the padlock. 
Q. But not, but didn't take fingerprints at the scene. Is that right? Or the tools 
themselves, you didn't take any fingerprints, did you? 
A. (Nodding negative). 
(R. 190:163). 
Although the Information states that an Officer Brisk matched Dillon's shoes and 
his truck tires, no evidence of this was presented at trial. (R. 8). Unlike Pitts, the 
evidence admitted at trial is ambiguous and is susceptible to the interpretation that Dillon 
did not commit the crime of burglary. In Pitts, eyewitness evidence was presented at trial 
that Pitts entered the convenience store and left shortly thereafter with a yellow envelope 
that was similar in appearance to the store's missing property. 728 P.2d at 114-15. 
However, in this case there is no such eyewitness testimony. No one saw Dillon enter or 
leave the trailer. No physical evidence was presented. In addition, the evidence 
presented that the tools were taken from the trailer between 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. when 
Dillon was stopped in the general vicinity of the trailer is susceptible to Dillon's 
testimony that he purchased the tools at approximately 9 p.m. (R. 190: 230, 235). 
In State v. Pacheco, 778 P.2d 26 (Utah 1989), this Court examined a similar issue. 
In Pacheco, one of the victims surprised Pacheco when he entered the house and several 
17 
neighbors saw Pacheco on the porch of the victims. In addition, one neighbor saw 
Pacheco as he fled, from only about twenty feet away, and positively identified him both 
before and at trial. This neighbor also observed the clothing he wore, which was similar 
to clothing seized from Pacheco's house, and noted the license plate number of the car the 
perpetrator drove. The car was registered to Pacheco. In this case, the Court concluded 
that the "evidence is not so inconclusive or improbable that reasonable minds would 
reasonably doubt Pacheco committed the crimes." Pacheco, 778 P.2d 26, 31. 
In contrast to Pacheco, there were no witnesses presented at trial who could place 
Dillon at the scene of the actual burglary. Moreover, Dillon's testimony that he 
purchased the tools that evening at approximately 9:00 p.m. is not inconsistent with the 
little evidence presented by the State on this charge. The evidence, Dillon asserts, is so 
inconclusive and improbable that reasonable minds could reasonably doubt that he 
committed the crime. 
Dillon asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence as a matter of law 
that establishes that he committed the crime of burglary. Dillon also asserts that the 
evidentiary defect—namely that he entered or remained unlawfully in a building or any 
portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft—was so obvious and 
fundamental that it was plain error to submit this charge to the jury. But for this error, 
Dillon would not have been convicted of the crime of burglary. 
B. Alternatively, Trial Counsel's Failure to Move for a Directed Verdict 
Constituted Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
Dillon's trial counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness for failing to move for a directed verdict on the burglary 
charge. Moreover, this deficient performance affected the outcome of the trial. 
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The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for "failing to make a motion for 
directed verdict succeeds only if the State's evidence was not sufficient to support a 
conviction." State v. Reyes, 2000 UT App 310 (memorandum decision); See also Tillman 
v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 222 (Utah 1993), cert denied, 510 U.S. 1050, 114 S.Ct. 706, 126 
L.Ed.2d 671 (1994) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on failure to move to 
dismiss where the evidence to convict was sufficient)). 
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, it is the defendant's burden 
to show that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, 
which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, 
and second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. As stated above, the 
evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to submit the burglary charge to the jury. 
Accordingly, trial counsel's performance was deficient for failing to move for a directed 
verdict under the reasoning set forth Reyes. But for this failure, this charge would not 
have been submitted to the jury and Dillon would not have been convicted of burglary. 
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POINT II 
THE STATE COMMITTED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
DURING CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DILLON 
Dillon asserts that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct when the 
prosecuting attorney engaged in improper and prejudicial questioning during cross-
examination of his testimony. Dillon asserts that this misconduct denied him a fair trial. 
The test of whether the remarks made by counsel are so objectionable as to merit a 
reversal in a criminal case is, did "the actions or remarks of [prosecuting] counsel call to 
the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its 
verdict and, if so, under the circumstances of the particular case, whether the error is 
substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in the absence, 
there would have been a more favorable result." State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 
(Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993)(citation omitted). This issue 
was partially preserved through an oral objection made at trial (R. 190: 252, 263, 265). 
Alternatively, this Court should review this issue for plain error. See State v. Saunders, 
1999 UT 59 f30, 992 P.2d 951 (Plain error analysis applied to claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct not raised at trial). 
Dillon asserts that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during cross-
examination under two separate theories: One, that the questioning of Dillon as to the 
veracity of another witness was not permissible under Utah law. Two, that the 
prosecuting attorney's questioning of Dillon as to prior bad acts was likewise improper. 
Dillon asserts that these questions called to the jury's attention matters that '"they would 
not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict.'" State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 
(Utah 1992) (citation omitted). Moreover, Dillon asserts that the impropriety of these 
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questions was obvious and well-settled under Utah case law; and that he was prejudiced 
and deprived of a fair trial by the prosecuting attorney's misconduct. 
In State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992), a father was convicted by a jury of 
committing sodomy on his five-year-old son. During cross examination, the prosecutor 
asked Emmett if he was claiming that his son was lying. The Supreme Court of Utah 
reasoned that the question was "argumentative and seeks information beyond the 
witness's competence." Id. at 787. The Court further reasoned that the "prejudicial effect 
of such a question lies in the fact that it suggests to the jury that a witness is committing 
perjury even though there are other explanations for the inconsistency. In addition, it 
puts the defendant in the untenable position of commenting on the character and 
motivations of another witness who may appear sympathetic to the jury. Id. The Court 
held that the question was improper. Id. 
In State v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693, 793 A.2d 226 (2002), the State's theory of the 
case was that the defendant had committed arson because of his financial difficulties. 
The prosecution presented several witnesses that testified to comments and actions made 
by the defendant regarding his financial status. Under cross-examination, after the 
defendant denied any such comments or behaviors, the prosecution asked whether the 
testimony of the witnesses was "incorrect or made up, or wrong," and whether the witness 
"came into court and lied." 793 A.2d at 234. In addition, the sole piece of evidence 
linking Singh to the crime was a pair of his shoes which tested positive for traces of 
gasoline; and again during cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Singh if the State's 
witnesses were "lying" and if they were "wrong or lying." Id. at 235. 
The Connecticut court adopted the rule of a majority of courts that it is improper to 
ask a witness to comment on another witness' truthfulness. One of the cases cited to by 
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the Connecticut court was Emmett. Additionally, the court opined that two important 
policy arguments support the prohibition of such questioning. First, it is "well established 
that 'determinations of credibility are for the jury, and not for witnesses.'" Singh, 793 
A.2d at 236 (citations omitted). Second, "questions of this sort also create the risk that 
the jury may conclude that, in order to acquit the defendant, it must find that the witness 
has lied." Id. at 237. In Singh, the prosecution's argument was, in essence, "that the only 
way the jury could conclude that the defendant had not set the fire was if it determined 
that five government witnesses had lied." Id. at 238. The Connecticut court held that the 
prosecuting attorney's comments and questions were improper. 
As in Emmett and Singh, there were several instances during the trial, that the 
prosecutor improperly questioned Dillon about his belief that Copeland was a liar. (R. 
190:244, 249, 251, 252) Further, after continuously questioning Dillon about his belief 
that Copeland was lying, the prosecutor accused Dillon of lying. (R. 190:252). 
Q. Okay. So when you say that you took off from Detective Copeland and you 
testified that you weren't going 90 miles an hour or you weren't passing 
cars, Detective Copeland I presume is lying about all of that? 
A. I'm, I'm not saying he was lying. 
(R. 190:244) 
Q. So, well, let me aks you this. When Mr., when Detective Copeland says 
that you didn't tell him the name of this person you bought the tools from, is 
he lying? 
A. That I didn't give him the name? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No. I didn't give him the name. But I gave him everything else. 
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(R. 190:249). 
Q. But you also told him, didn't you, that you'd had them for two weeks? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. So Detective Copeland is lying about that? 
A. I, all I can tell you is, is what I said, what I, you know. 
Q. What you said about what? 
A. All I can tell you is what I said, I never said I had (short inaudible, two 
speakers). 
Q. I did you have any reason to believe ... Why would ... Do you have any 
reason to believe that Detective Copeland would have any interest in lying 
in this case? 
A. I'm not going to say he's lying. 
Q. Well one of you is lying, aren't you? 
A. I'm not. 
Q. Okay. So Detective Copeland is lying? 
MR. COMBS: Your honor, objection. Argumentative. 
THE JUDGE: It is, Counsel. Let's get into something else. Sustained. 
(R. 190:251-252). 
However, during further examination of Dillon, the prosecuting attorney again 
questioned Dillon about witness veracity and his own truthfulness when he asked Dillon 
about only speaking with Detective Copeland if it was unrecorded (R. 190: 263-264). 
During this questioning the following exchange occurred: 
Q. Was it because you presumably didn't want any kind of a record of what 
you told him? 
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A. No. 
Q. So that you could tell him one thing and then here today you could tell him 
something else? 
A. I'm not telling him nothing else today. 
(R. 190: 264). Accordingly, even after defense counsel's objection as to this type of 
questioning by the State was sustained, the prosecuting attorney continued the improper 
questioning. 
Dillon asserts that the impropriety of asking "a criminal defendant to comment on 
the veracity of another witness" is well-settled under Utah law. See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 
787. Accordingly, the misconduct by the prosecuting attorney in repeatedly questioning 
Dillon about the veracity of other witnesses and himself should have been obvious to the 
prosecutor. This questioning "is argumentative and seeks information beyond the 
witness's competence. The prejudicial effect of such a question lies in the fact that it 
suggests to the jury that a witness is committing perjury even though there are other 
explanations for the inconsistency. In addition, it puts the defendant in the untenable 
position of commenting on the character and motivations of another witness who may 
appear sympathetic to the jury." Id. Moreover, Dillon asserts that it is well-established' 
under Utah law that prosecutors "have a duty to eschew all improper tactics." Emmett, 
839 P.2d at 787. See also, State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 557 (Utah 1987). Therefore, 
like the defendant in Emmett, Dillon was prejudiced was prejudiced this line of 
questioning and deprived of a fair trial. 
Dillon also asserts that the prosecuting attorney committed misconduct in 
questioning him about prior bad acts in order to establish that Dillon is an habitual 
criminal. In Emmett, the Court held that Rule 404(b) of Utah Rules of Evidence 
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expressly states, "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith." In Emmett, 
the prosecutor commented on Emmett's forgery conviction. The prosecutor noted that the 
victim of the forgery was Emmett's sister. The prosecutor then commented that Emmett 
had again taken advantage of a family member. 839 P.2d at 785. The Court held that this 
comment "clearly urged the jury to view Emmett as a person who commits crimes against 
his family and to use this characteristic as evidence that Emmett sodomized his son." Id. 
at 786. 
In this case, the prosecutor questioned Dillon about his previous history of buying 
stolen tools. 
Q. Detective Copeland testified that... 
Well, did you ever buy stolen tools before, Mr. Dillon? 
A. I've had problems before, not too many. 
(R. 190:248). 
Dillon's answer to this question—"I've had problems before"—called attention to 
Dillon's past criminal history. The prosecutor also made comments during questioning 
regarding Dillon's reaction to run when he is fearful of being in trouble with the law. 
Q. Well, Mr. Dillon, isn't it true that when you're fearful of being in trouble 
with the law that your reaction is to run? 
A. I didn't run. I pulled over. 
Q. Pulled over after three miles. Correct? 
A. I... If, if that's what you want to call it, three miles, then it must have been 
three miles. 
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(R. 190:264). The prosecutor also questioned Dillon during his cross examination of 
Dillon's belief that when an officer decides to stop him he could take off and stop 
whenever he wants. 
Q. Okay. So, so what made you believe that when an officer decides to stop 
you that you can take off and you can just stop whenever you want? 
A. Well, it's my understanding that if a cop is going to stop you that they 
usually look like cops. 
Q. Interesting. 
A. I wasn't trying to allude him. 
Q. You say you stopped. I think your exact words were you stopped when you 
saw those other two cops. Now other implies that there's another officer 
behind you. Correct? 
A. In front of me. 
Q. Behind you, Officer Copeland, he was behind you. Right? 
A. That's what you're trying to put in my mouth, yeah. 
(R. 190:245-246). 
All of these examples show that the prosecutor was clearly urging the jury to view 
Dillon as a person who has committed these types of crimes before and was attempting to 
use this characteristic evidence to show that Dillon stole the tools in this case. As the 
court held in Emmett, "the clarity of the law in this area and the blatant nature of the 
prosecutor's statements" 839 P.2d at 786 should have made it "obvious to the trial court 
that the prosecutor's remarks called to the jurors' attention matters they were not justified 
in considering." Id. Therefore, the first part of the plain error standard has been met. 
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Step two of the plain error standard is more difficult and involves a consideration 
of the circumstances of the case as a whole. In making such a consideration, it is 
appropriate to look at the evidence of defendant's guilt. State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 
(Utah 1984). "If proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or remark 
will not be presumed prejudicial." Troy, 688 P.2d at 486 (citation omitted). Likewise, in a 
case, with less compelling proof, this Court should more closely scrutinize the conduct. If 
the conclusion of the jurors is based on their weighing conflicting evidence or evidence 
susceptible of differing interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that they will be 
improperly influenced through remarks of counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the jurors may 
be searching for guidance in weighing and interpreting the evidence. They may be 
especially susceptible to influence, and a small degree of influence may be sufficient to 
affect the verdict. Counsel is obligated in such cases to avoid, as far as possible, any 
reference to those matters the jury is not justified in considering. Troy, 688 P.2d at 487. 
The court in Singh, stated that "a prosecutor 'is not only an officer of the court, 
like every other attorney, but is also a high public officer, representing the people of the 
State, who seek impartial justice for the guilty as much as for the innocent.... By reason of 
his [or her] office, [the prosecutor] usually exercises great influence upon jurors. [The 
prosecutor's] conduct and language in the trial of cases in which human life or liberty are 
at stake should be forceful, but fair, because he [or she] represents the public interest, 
which demands no victim and asks no conviction through the aid of passion, prejudice or 
resentment. If the accused be guilty, he [or she] should none the less be convicted only 
after a fair trial, conducted strictly according to the sound and well-established rules 
which the laws prescribe." Singh, 259 Conn. 693, 701, 793 A.2d 226, 233 (quoting State 
v. Alexander, supra, at 302, 755 A.2d 868). 
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Dillon asserts that there was not compelling proof of his guilt and that the jury 
could have found either way. Dillon further asserts that the jurors were influenced by the 
prejudicial remarks of the prosecutor and he was therefore denied a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Dillon requests that this Court reverse his conviction for burglary because the 
evidence was insufficient to establish that he committed the crime. Dillon also requests 
that this Court reverse his convictions because of prosecutorial misconduct that was 
prejudicial and deprived him of a fair trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of May, 2005. 
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ADDENDA 
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UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 76-6-206*2 
(b) intrusion of any physical object under control of 
the actor. 1973 
,8.6-202. Burg la ry . 
ni An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains 
1 wfuUy m a building or any portion of a building with 
J n t to commit: 
(a) a felony, 
(b) theft; 
(c) an assault on any person, 
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1); 
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3); 
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 
76-9-702.5; or 
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-
702.7(2) or (5). 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was 
committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the 
second degree. 
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any 
of the offenses listed in Subsections (l)(a) through (g), and 
which may be committed by the actor while he is in the 
building. 2003 
76-6-203. A g g r a v a t e d bu rg l a ry . 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempt-
ing committing, or fleeing from a burglary the actor or 
another participant in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a 
participant in the crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous 
weapon against any person who is not a participant in the 
crime; or 
(c) possesses or at tempts to use any explosive or danr 
gerous weapon. 
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony. 
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the 
same definition as under Section 76-1-601. 1989 
76-6-204. B u r g l a r y of a veh ic l e — C h a r g e of o t h e r 
offense. 
(1) Any person who unlawfully enters any vehicle with 
intent to commit a felony or theft is guilty of a burglary of a 
vehicle. 
(2) Burglary of a vehicle is a class A misdemeanor 
(3) A charge against any person for a violation of Subsection 
(1) shall not preclude a charge for a commission of any other 
offense. 1973 
56-6-205. M a n u f a c t u r e o r p o s s e s s i o n of i n s t r u m e n t for 
b u r g l a r y o r thef t . 
Any person who manufactures or possesses any instrument, 
tool, device, article, or other thing adapted, designed, or 
commonly used in advancing or facilitating the commission of 
any offense under circumstances manifesting an intent to use 
or knowledge tha t some person intends to use the same in the 
commission of a burglary or theft is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 1973 
'6-6-206. C r i m i n a l t r e s p a s s . 
(1) For purposes of this section, "enter" means intrusion of 
'lie entire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal t respass if, under circum-
stances not amounting to burglary as defined in Section 
76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204 or a violation of Section 
10-2402 regarding commercial terrorism 
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and: 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any 
person or damage to any property, including the use 
of graffiti as defined in Section 76-6-107; 
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft 
or a felony; or 
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will 
cause fear for the safety of another; 
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he 
enters or remains on property as to which notice against 
entering is given by: 
(i) personal communication to the actor by the 
owner or someone with apparent authority to" act for 
the owner; 
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed 
to exclude intruders; or 
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to 
the attention of intruders; or 
(c) he enters a condominium unit in violation of Sub1-
section 57-8-7(7). 
(3) (a) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a class C misde-
meanor unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which 
event it is a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) A violation of Subsection (2)(b) is an infraction. 
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section tha t the: 
(a) property was open to the public when the actor 
entered or remained; and 
(b) actor's conduct did not substantially interfere with 
the owner's use of the property. 2001 
76-6-206.1. C r i m i n a l t r e s p a s s of abandoned or inact ive 
m i n e s — Penalty. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Abandoned or inactive mine" means an under-
ground mine which is no longer open for access or no 
longer under excavation and has been clearly marked as 
closed or protected from entry. 
(b) "Enter" means intrusion of the entire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass of an abandoned 
or inactive mine if, under circumstances not amounting to 
burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204: 
(a) the person intentionally enters and remains unlaw-
fully in the underground workings of an abandoned or 
inactive mine; or 
(b) intentionally and without authority removes, de-
stroys, or tampers with any warning sign, covering, 
fencing, or other method of protection from entry placed 
on, around, or over any mine shaft, mine portal, or other 
abandoned or inactive mining excavation property. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a class B misdemeanor. 
(4) A violation of Subsection (2)(b) is a class A misdemeanor. 
1997 
76-6-206.2. Criminal trespass on state park lands — 
Penal t ies . 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Authorization" means specific written permission 
by, or contractual agreement with, the Division of Parks 
and Recreation. 
(b) "Criminal trespass" means the elements of the 
crime of criminal trespass, as set forth in Section 76-6-
206. 
(c) "Division" means the Division of Parks and Recre-
ation, as referred to in Section 63-11-3.1. 
(d) "State park lands" means all lands administered by 
the division. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass on s ta te park 
lands and is liable for the civil damages prescribed in Subsec-
tion (5) if, under circumstances not amounting to a greater 
offense, and without authorization, the person: 
(a) constructs improvements or structures on state 
park lands; 
(b) uses or occupies state park lands for more than 30 
days after the cancellation or expiration of authorization; 
